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MITIGATING RISK, ERADICATING SLAVERY   
RAMONA L. LAMPLEY* 
For U.S. companies with forced labor or child labor in the supply chain, 
litigation is on the rise.  This Article surveys the current litigation landscape 
involving forced labor in the supply chain.  It ultimately concludes that 
domestic corporations that source from international suppliers should adopt 
the Model Contract Clauses drafted by the ABA Business Law Section 
Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International Supply 
Contracts (“Working Group”).  This Article traces the origins of cases 
involving supply chain forced labor, beginning with the early employee 
negligence cases that form the backdrop of existing case law and the 
cornerstone of the Model Contract disclaimers.  Part III turns to the evolving 
consumer class actions based on deceptive trade practices.  Part IV addresses 
the complexities of employee-based cases alleging violations of the ATS, and by 
comparison, this Part also illustrates why the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) extraterritorial jurisdictional grant may 
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provide fertile ground for domestic litigation involving foreign forced labor in 
the supply chain.  Finally, Part V discusses the origin of the disclaimer clauses 
in the MCCs proposed by the Working Group, and the arguments in favor of 
using the MCCs as a foundation for reducing abusive labor practices in the 
supply chain, even for those brought under the TVPRA.  The Article concludes 
that the threat of domestic liability is on a steady upward trajectory, and 
businesses are well-advised to begin incorporating contractual rights and 
remedies to deal with the problem of forced labor in the supply chain, but in a 
way that does not increase the potential for domestic liability. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 I. Forced Labor in the Supply Chain?   Domestic  
Retailers Beware ..................................................................... 1709 
 II. Workers’ Negligence-Theory Cases ....................................... 1712 
A.   Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp. ............................................ 1713 
B.   Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. .............................................. 1716 
 III. Consumers’ False Advertising Claims Based on Failure to 
Disclose Abusive Labor Practices in the Supply Chain ......... 1718 
A.   National Consumers League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ........... 1719 
B.   The Chocolate Cases ........................................................ 1721 
C.   The Fishermen Cases ....................................................... 1727 
 IV. Employee Cases:  The Viability of the Alien Tort Statute 
and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act Against Domestic Entities ................................................ 1729 
A.   The Alien Tort Statute as a Basis for Liability Against 
Domestic Corporations ..................................................... 1729 
B.  Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
Claims ............................................................................... 1738 
 V. How Adopting the Model Contract Clauses to Implement 
Human Rights Protections in Supply Contracts Can 
Reduce the Threat of Litigation ............................................ 1746 
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 1750 
  
2019] MITIGATING RISK, ERADICATING SLAVERY 1709 
 
I.    FORCED LABOR IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN?   
DOMESTIC RETAILERS BEWARE 
Domestic retailers beware.  Is there forced labor or slave labor in 
your supply chain?  If so, your vulnerability as a target for litigation is 
on the rise.  Recent changes in federal law make it more likely that 
such causes of action, whether brought by an individual or as a class, 
will be successful.  Consider the consumer who buys a bag of 
chocolate for distributing to her neighborhood children on 
Halloween.  Would that person have bought the same chocolate had 
she known it was the product of child labor?  Is that a material fact 
that ought to have been disclosed to the ultimate purchaser, much 
like an ingredient that now taints the product?  Should the 
manufacturer bear civil liability to consumers for failing to disclose 
the probability of child labor in its supply chain, even if it did not 
force the hand of the laborers?1  It is no stretch to say that some 
states’ consumer protection laws, at a minimum, prohibit giving a 
false impression that one sells ethically sourced products.2 
Forced labor in the United States is illegal.3  It exists, but it is 
heavily regulated, at least in comparison to other developing 
                                               
 1. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Tomasella v. Hershey Co., No. 1:18-cv-10360 
(D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2018), 2018 WL 1051865; Class Action Complaint, Tomasella v. 
Mars, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-10359 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2018), 2018 WL 1051861; Class 
Action Complaint, Tomasella v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-10269 (D. Mass. Feb. 
12, 2018), 2018 WL 823151.  See generally Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 
(N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018); McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 
F. Supp. 3d 954 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 462 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); 
Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 460 
(9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); see also Wirth v. Mars, Inc., No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx), 
2016 WL 471234 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 468 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(mem.); Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 15-cv-03783-JSW, 2016 WL 192569 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 15, 2016), amended by 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 731 F. 
App’x 719 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Barber v. Nestle USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954 
(C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.). 
 2. See Nat’l Consumers League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2016 CA 007731 B, 2016 
WL 4080541 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 22, 2016) (holding that under Washington D.C.’s 
Consumer Protection Procedures Act, in-depth descriptions and detailed statistics of the 
supplier auditing process can influence the reasonable consumer’s purchasing decisions 
and give rise to an actionable false impression); see also infra Section III.A. 
 3. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008 (TVPRA), Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).  Under the TVPRA, forced labor means 
providing or obtaining labor or services by force, physical restraint, serious harm, or 
threats of such; by abuse of the law or legal process, or threats of such; or by “any 
scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person 
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countries.4  The problem is heightened when domestic entities 
acquire products or supplies from an international supply chain 
because labor is subject to a different set of rules and regulations, 
which may not be enforced.5  Some of the inexpensive products we 
buy come with a cost, a cost unknown to many of us.  Domestic 
litigation is about, in part, exposing those external costs.  In 2016, 
Professor David Snyder formed the Working Group to Draft Human 
Rights Protections in International Supply Contracts (“Working 
Group”), a part of the ABA Business Law Section.6  In the early stages 
of the Working Group, I was asked to research domestic litigation, in 
whatever form, involving the use of forced labor in the supply chain.  
We began with one case:  Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp.7  But in the 
months and weeks that passed, the amount and complexity of the 
litigation involving these issues escalated.  Research revealed an 
increasing mass of consumer class actions brought by those who were 
defrauded by the knowing, or at best, willfully ignorant use of forced 
labor in the supply chain.  At the same time, viable legal theories 
                                               
did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer 
serious harm or physical restraint.”  18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a)(1)–(4) (2012).  My use of 
“forced labor” in this piece includes both this definition in the TVPRA and slave 
labor.  In contrast, using the term child labor invites a conversation as to whether it is 
illegal or legal child labor and under which jurisdiction’s laws.  That discussion, while 
meritorious, is beyond the scope of this piece.  The use of the term “child labor” in 
this piece is based on an understanding that the labor practices involved would 
violate social norms and, at a minimum, U.S. labor laws. 
 4. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (imposing severe criminal penalties and civil liability for 
those who engage in forced labor practices); see also Forced Labor, END SLAVERY NOW, 
http://www.endslaverynow.org/learn/slavery-today/forced-labor (last visited June 1, 
2019) (detailing the prevalence of forced labor in the United States).  Cf.  Free the 
Slaves and the Human Rights Center of the University of California, Berkeley, Hidden 
Slaves Forced Labor in the United States, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 47 (2005). 
 5. See, e.g., Galit A. Sarfarty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 419, 423 (2015) (explaining the challenges with regulating multi-national and 
multi-tiered supply chains through domestic regulations). 
 6.  Additional commentary by members of the Working Group on international 
supply chains and the MCCs can be found in this symposium issue. See generally E. 
Christopher Johnson Jr. et al., The Business Case for Lawyers to Advocate for Corporate 
Supply Chains Free of Labor Trafficking and Child Labor,  68 AM. U. L. REV. 1555 (2019); 
David V. Snyder, The New Social Contracts in International Supply Chains, 68 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1869 (2019); see also Jennifer S. Martin, Private Law Remedies, Human Rights, and 
Supply Contracts, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1781 (2019); Jonathan C. Lipson, Something Else:  
Specific Relief for Breach of Human Rights Terms in Supply Chain Agreements, 68 AM. U. L. 
REV 1751 (2019).  But see Sarah Dadush, Contracting for Human Rights:  Looking to 
Version 2.0 of the ABA Model Contract Clauses, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1519 (2019).  
 7. No. N15C-07-174MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016). 
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brought by employees of foreign suppliers were developing under the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)8 and 
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).9  The research revealed that many 
businesses would benefit from a model agreement designed to 
warrant against the use of forced labor in the supply chain and 
address remedies for breach. 
In 2018, the work of the Working Group came to fruition with the 
publication of Model Contract Clauses (“MCCs”) for domestic buyers 
to use in their international purchase agreements to guard against 
the use of forced labor in the supply chain.10  Every domestic company 
that sources from international entities should consider adopting the 
MCCs in some form.11  David Snyder and Susan Maslow have discussed 
the MCCs in their work, Human Rights Protections in International Supply 
Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk.12 
This Article discusses the emerging trends in domestic litigation 
involving forced labor in the supply chain and how the disclaimers 
that appear in MCCs were drafted with the intent of reducing 
litigation risk for the domestic entities that adopt them.  Recent 
litigation against domestic retailers of goods involving alleged human 
trafficking in the supply chain generally falls into two areas:  
employee cases and consumer deceptive advertising cases.  Part II of 
this Article traces the origin of these cases beginning with the early 
employee negligence cases that form the backdrop of existing case 
law and the cornerstone of the Model Contract disclaimers.  Part III 
turns to the evolving consumer class actions based on deceptive trade 
practices.  Part IV addresses the complexities of employee-based cases 
alleging violations of the ATS, and by comparison, this Part also 
illustrates why the TVPRA extraterritorial jurisdictional grant may 
                                               
 8. Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).   
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  The ATS, enacted in 1789, provides:  “The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”  Id. 
 10. David Snyder & Susan Maslow, Human Rights Protections in International Supply 
Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk:  2018 Report and Model Contract 
Clauses from the Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International Supply 
Contracts, 73 BUS. LAW. 1093 (2018) [hereinafter Model Contract Clauses]. 
 11. Cf. E. Christopher Johnson Jr., Business Lawyers Are in a Unique Position to Help 
Their Clients Identify Supply-Chain Risks Involving Labor-Trafficking and Child Labor, 70 BUS. 
LAW. 1083, 1102–03 (2015) (encouraging businesses to adopt the ABA’s Model 
Principles for Labor Trafficking and Child Labor, including supply chain monitoring). 
 12. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 10, at 1093. 
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provide fertile ground for domestic litigation involving foreign forced 
labor in the supply chain.  Finally, Part V discusses the origin of the 
disclaimer clauses in the MCCs proposed by the Working Group, and 
the arguments in favor of using the MCCs as a foundation for 
reducing abusive labor practices in the supply chain, even for those 
brought under the TVPRA.  The Article concludes that the threat of 
domestic liability is on a steady upward trajectory, and businesses are 
well-advised to begin incorporating contractual rights and remedies 
to deal with the problem of forced labor in the supply chain, but in a 
way that does not increase the potential for domestic liability. 
Some may claim that the MCCs go too far in protecting domestic 
entities, which often wield all or most of the bargaining power with 
their international suppliers.  This may be so, but the goal at this 
point is to persuade domestic entities to adopt and enforce the 
contractual agreements in an effort to eradicate forced labor in the 
supply chain.13  Companies would be hard-pressed to adopt a contract 
that could open them up to liability in the form of duty assumption 
or control.  Therefore, the disclaimers that are part of the MCCs 
protect, rather than make vulnerable, adopting companies from 
more liability than they would face otherwise.14    
Overall, domestic litigation over forced labor has met with limited 
success until very recently, although some cases discussed in this 
piece are pending appeal.  But the act of asserting these cases, as in 
the California “chocolate” cases, attracts media attention and influences 
the domestic consumer market for these products.  From a marketing 
standpoint, domestic manufacturers and retailers should be concerned 
about the market effect of these supply-side human trafficking cases.  
From a litigation risk perspective, developments in the extraterritorial 
reach of the TVPRA could prove to be extremely problematic for any 
company with reckless indifference to forced labor in its supply chain. 
II.     WORKERS’ NEGLIGENCE-THEORY CASES 
This section describes some of the fundamental cases behind the 
Model Contract Disclaimers—those brought by the workers against 
domestic purchasing companies alleging negligence in failure to 
                                               
 13. See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 747, 792 (acknowledging that “[p]rivate regulation through corporate codes of 
conduct and monitoring may actually be the only way that labor and environmental 
conditions are addressed in some developing countries”). 
 14. Id. at 1095, 1105. 
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prevent labor abuses in their supply chains.  These early cases formed 
the building blocks for current employee cases. 
A.    Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp. 
Our research began with a factory collapse, a humanitarian 
tragedy, and a lawsuit.  On April 24, 2013, an eight-story commercial 
building that housed multiple garment factories in Bangladesh 
collapsed, killing over 1000 and injuring over 2500 people.  Many 
victims were female workers and children.15  An engineer inspected 
the building the day before the collapse and declared it unsafe.16  In 
Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp.,17 the plaintiffs filed a class action on 
behalf of other workers and those who died in the collapse against 
domestic retailers J.C. Penney, The Children’s Place, and Wal-Mart.18  
The plaintiffs alleged negligence and wrongful death in the domestic 
retailers’ failing to monitor their Bangladeshi clothing suppliers.19  
The complaint further alleged the retailer defendants knew of the 
unsafe working conditions in Rana Plaza and breached their duty to 
the suppliers’ workers by failing to “implement standards and 
oversight mechanisms designed to ensure the health and safety of 
workers who manufactured clothing for their stores.”20 
The Delaware Superior Court dismissed the claims on two 
grounds.21  First, the court held the claim was barred by the 
Bangladeshi one-year statute of limitations.22  Although the court 
could have resolved this case on the statute of limitations issue, it 
went on to render a decision on the negligence claim.23  The court 
likely resolved the negligence claim to set a precedent for supply-side 
human trafficking cases based on a tort duty to monitor.    
The court held the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for negligence 
because the retailer defendants had no duty to monitor factory 
                                               
 15. Id.; see also Complaint ¶ 3, Rahaman v. JC Penney Corp., No. 1:15-cv-00619 
(D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Rahaman Complaint].   
 16. Rahaman Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 3. 
 17. No. N15C-07-174MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016). 
 18. Id. at *1.  The complaint was originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia, and it named Bangladesh as a defendant.  See Rahaman 
Complaint, supra note 15.  The plaintiffs withdrew the case from federal court and 
refiled in Delaware Superior Court. 
 19. Rahaman, 2016 WL 2616375, at *1. 
 20. Rahaman Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 5–6. 
 21. Rahaman, 2016 WL 2616375, at *7, *10. 
 22. Id. at *7. 
 23. Id. at *10. 
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conditions.24  Under Delaware law, “[i]n negligence cases alleging 
nonfeasance, or an omission to act, there is no general duty to others 
without a ‘special relationship’ between the parties.”25  The plaintiffs 
argued they—as workers—fell within an exception to this no-duty 
rule because they were employed as independent contractors for the 
defendant.26  Under the peculiar risk doctrine, an employer of an 
independent contractor is subject to liability when an independent 
contractor is hired to do work the employer should see is likely to 
create a peculiar risk of harm without special precautions.27  The 
court rejected this argument for several reasons. 
The court first rejected the existence of a duty on behalf of the 
retailer defendants because there were no allegations establishing a 
“peculiar risk.”28  “The risk contemplated by the doctrine is ‘peculiar 
to the work to be done, and arising out of . . . the place where it is to 
be done, against which a reasonable [person] would recognize the 
necessity of taking special precautions.’”29  The court held that 
inadequacies in the construction of Rana Plaza were not peculiar to 
the business in which the defendants engaged, and the defendants 
could not reasonably be expected to take precautions against a 
building collapse when sourcing garments from Bangladesh.30 
The court also held the peculiar risk doctrine did not apply to this 
class of plaintiffs because they were employees of the garment 
factories, not of the defendants.31  Under Delaware statutory law, “[an] 
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm 
caused to another by an act of omission of the contractor or his 
servants.”32  In other words, the defendants were shielded from liability 
because they indirectly acquired the goods from the supplier. 
There are exceptions to the general rule that a contractor does not 
have a duty to protect an independent contractor’s employees from 
                                               
 24. Id. at *9. 
 25. Id. at *8; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  
There is no duty to act for the protection of a third party unless there is a special 
relationship.  A special relationship exists between socially recognized relations such 
as parent and child, employer and employee, and innkeeper and guest.  §§ 314–15. 
 26. Rahaman, 2016 WL 2616375, at *8. 
 27. Id; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413. 
 28. Rahaman, 2016 WL 2616375, at *9. 
 29. Id. at *8 (quoting Bryant v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., No. 89C-08-070, 
1995 WL 653987, at *1, *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 1995)). 
 30. Id. at *9. 
 31. Id. at *8. 
 32. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409. 
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foreseeable hazards.  The exceptions exist “when the general contractor; 
(1) actively controls the manner and method of performing the contract 
work; (2) voluntarily undertakes the responsibility for implementing 
safety measures; or (3) retains possessory control over the work premises 
during work.”33  The court held that none of these exceptions applied 
because the retail defendants’ only contact with the garment factories 
was through indirect sourcing.34  Because the defendants did not undertake 
any safety responsibilities and did not control the work being done, these limited 
exceptions to the no-duty rule did not apply.35 
The plaintiffs also made a basic foreseeability argument, 
contending the defendants were aware of the long history of injuries 
and fatalities due to the poor working conditions.36  But the court 
held that even if the defendants knew or should have known of the 
risks at the garment warehouse, knowledge would not establish a duty 
of care when the defendants had neither asserted control over the 
work nor assumed responsibility for safety measures.37  The court also 
rejected the somewhat tangential argument that the defendants’ 
ethical sourcing statements established a duty of care.38 
Finally, the plaintiffs argued the defendants owed a duty of care under 
the illegal-conduct exception, which “imposes liability on the employer of 
an independent contractor where ‘the employer causes or knows of and 
sanctions illegal conduct.’”39  The court found no evidence that the 
plaintiffs were required to engage in illegal conduct to manufacture the 
garments and no provision in the supply contracts to source garments 
from factories in which the work was performed illegally.40 
Thus, the court resoundingly rejected all arguments that the retail 
defendants, as remote purchasers, owed a duty to the suppliers’ 
employees, even if the retail defendants had knowledge of unsafe 
working conditions.41  The plaintiffs did not appeal. 
                                               
 33. Rahaman, 2016 WL 2616375, at *9. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  Note the importance of this conclusion in terms of the contractual 
disclaimers discussed infra Part V.  From the drafting perspective, it will likely be 
important to purchasing entities that any contract does not establish the control or 
responsibility that would meet these exceptions. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (quoting Colon v. Gannett Co., No. 180, 2013, 2013 WL 5819666, at *1 
(Del. Oct. 28, 2013)). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at *10. 
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B.   Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
In reaching the “no duty” decision in Rahaman, Judge Johnston relied 
on the decision in Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Doe I”),42 which bears 
important implications for any company faced with potential forced labor 
in the supply chain.  In Doe I, the plaintiff-employees of foreign companies 
filed a class action against Wal-Mart alleging Wal-Mart had breached its 
supplier code of conduct (“Standards for Suppliers”) in failing to 
adequately monitor and correct the unsafe working conditions of its 
suppliers.43  The standards were incorporated into supply contracts with 
foreign suppliers.44  They required the suppliers to “adhere to local laws 
and local industry standards regarding working conditions like pay, hours, 
forced labor, child labor and discrimination.”45  The contracts also 
included a right to unannounced inspections.46 
The plaintiffs alleged Wal-Mart knew its suppliers often violated the 
Standards and did not adequately monitor the working conditions.47  
They also alleged the short deadlines and low prices in Wal-Mart’s 
supply contracts actually force suppliers to violate the Standards to meet 
the terms of the contract.48  The plaintiffs advanced four theories of 
liability:  (1) they were third-party beneficiaries of these standards; (2) 
Wal-Mart was a joint employer; (3) Wal-Mart negligently breached a duty 
to monitor suppliers’ working conditions; and (4) Wal-Mart was unjustly 
enriched by the plaintiffs’ mistreatment.49 
Following district court dismissal for failure to state a claim, the 
plaintiffs appealed.50  The Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that the 
standards did not create a third-party beneficiary cause of action 
because it only gave Wal-Mart the right to inspect the suppliers, not a 
duty to inspect them.51  Although the contract imposed consequences 
on the supplier for failure to comply with inspections—potential 
cancellation or loss of business—there were no comparable adverse 
consequences that would inure to Wal-Mart for failure to inspect.  
                                               
 42. 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 43. Id. at 679–80.  The employees were from suppliers based in China, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Swaziland, and Nicaragua. 
 44. Id. at 680. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 681. 
 50. Id. at 679–80. 
 51. Id. at 681–82. 
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Thus, the court held that Wal-Mart made no promise to monitor, and 
no such promise flowed to the plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries.52  
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that they could sue 
Wal-Mart based on the suppliers’ breach of the contractual duty to 
maintain certain working conditions because a donee third-party 
beneficiary may only recover against the promisor, not the promisee.53 
Whether Wal-Mart was an “employer” of the foreign employees 
hinged on whether Wal-Mart had a right to control and direct 
activities of the supplier, or the manner and method in which the 
work is performed.54  Citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly55 and Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal,56 the court held the plaintiffs provided no factual allegations 
that Wal-Mart exercised day-to-day control over operations.57  
Further, the court held that supply contract terms such as deadlines, 
quality of products, and price do not constitute sufficient day-to-day 
control over a supplier’s employees as to create an employment 
relationship between the purchaser and the supplier’s employees.58  
The Ninth Circuit also held that Wal-Mart did not owe the plaintiffs a 
common-law duty to monitor its suppliers or prevent the plaintiffs’ 
mistreatment.59  This “no duty” holding was based on (1) the absence 
of a contractual duty, as discussed above; (2) the absence of factual 
allegations that Wal-Mart exercised significant control over work 
conditions and affirmatively contributed to the plaintiffs’ injuries; 
and (3) the court’s rejection of a common-law duty to monitor 
suppliers to protect their employees.60 
The court also rejected the unjust enrichment claim because there 
was no prior relationship between the plaintiffs and Wal-Mart.61  The 
plaintiffs argued that Wal-Mart was unjustly enriched by profiting 
from its relationships with suppliers at the plaintiffs’ expense.62  But, 
according to the court, “a party generally may not seek to disgorge 
another’s profits unless a ‘prior relationship between the parties’” gave 
                                               
 52. Id. at 682. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 56. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 57. Doe I v. Wal-Mart, 572 F.3d at 683. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 684. 
 61. Id. at 684–85. 
 62. Id. at 685. 
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rise to the unjust benefit.63  The court had already held that Wal-Mart 
did not exert control over the plaintiffs and was not the employer.  It 
observed that there is no “plausible basis upon which the employee of a 
manufacturer, without more, may obtain restitution from one who 
purchases goods from that manufacturer.”64 
Doe I provides a useful guide in tailoring the MCCs to one’s own 
business needs to avoid unintentionally exposing the business to 
domestic liability (for the acts of its supplier) through assumption of 
control over that supplier.65  Even under Wal-Mart’s Standards for 
Suppliers, which imposed a supplier obligation to provide local 
industry-standard working conditions and gave Wal-Mart a right of 
inspection, the court found no contract, tort, or equitable cause of 
action.  The false advertising cases take a different strategy to supply-
side human trafficking instances.  
III.    CONSUMERS’ FALSE ADVERTISING CLAIMS BASED ON FAILURE TO 
DISCLOSE ABUSIVE LABOR PRACTICES IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
Another set of cases involving abusive labor practices in the supply 
chain assert consumer protection claims, usually class claims, for false 
advertising against domestic retailers.  Most recently, plaintiffs have 
filed deceptive advertising and unjust enrichment cases in the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts based on forced 
labor in the supply of domestic chocolate.66  Another very recent case 
                                               
 63. Id. (quoting Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Sometimes, the level of control or inspection is not entirely up to the domestic 
entity.  For instance, the Federal Acquisitions Regulations (“FAR”) governs government 
contractors.  FAR 52.222-50(h), Combating Trafficking in Persons, requires any 
contractor providing supplies acquired outside the United States (other than 
commercially available off the shelf items) or services performed outside the United 
States with an estimated value to exceed $500,000 to maintain a compliance plan that 
includes “[p]rocedures to prevent agents and subcontractors at any tier and at any dollar 
value from engaging in trafficking in persons . . . and to monitor, detect, and terminate any 
agents, subcontracts, or subcontractor employees that have engaged in such activities.”  FAR 
52.222-50(h) (2016) (emphasis added).  This means that for government contracts 
meeting the $500,000 non-domestic supply requirement, the FAR necessitates a level of 
control beyond that which insulated Wal-Mart from liability in Doe I and is inconsistent 
with the disclaimers discussed in Part V.  A business may have persuasive reasons for 
not adopting the disclaimers in their entirety, such as being subject to the FAR.  But the 
business should do so aware of the potential risks involved in terms of assuming greater 
control over the indirect supplier’s employees. 
 66. See generally Class Action Complaint, Tomasella v. Hershey Co., No. 1:18-cv-10360 
(D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2018), 2018 WL 1051865 [hereinafter Hershey Co. Class Action 
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in the District of Columbia narrowly survived a motion to dismiss.67  
The other consumer protection cases brought to date generally fall 
into two categories:  the chocolate cases68 and the fishermen cases.69  
While the Model Contract Disclaimers will have less impact on 
consumer protection actions, the cases illustrate how supply 
agreements affect consumer perception and, more importantly, the 
emerging litigation risk from consumer classes as consumers become 
more aware, and more appalled, over how their products are 
sourced.  I begin with the case that probably signals the evolutionary 
path of consumer-based deceptive advertising litigation in this area. 
A.   National Consumers League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
In late 2015, the National Consumers League (NCL) filed suit 
against Wal-Mart, J.C. Penney, and The Children’s Place (“Retailers” 
or “Retail Defendants”) alleging the Retail Defendants’ corporate 
social responsibility statements on their websites misled consumers 
regarding the use of forced labor or child labor in the supply chain, 
violating the District of Columbia’s Consumer Protection Procedures 
Act (CPPA).70  The plaintiff alleged that the Retail Defendants’ 
websites discussed their efforts to impose a general code of conduct 
on their suppliers regarding the production of goods.71  For example, 
                                               
Complaint]; Class Action Complaint, Tomasella v. Mars, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-10359 (D. Mass. 
Feb. 26, 2018), 2018 WL 1051861 [hereinafter Mars, Inc. Class Action Complaint]; Class 
Action Complaint, Tomasella v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-10269 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 
2018), 2018 WL 823151 [hereinafter Nestle USA, Inc. Class Action Complaint]. 
 67. See Nat’l Consumers League v. Wal-Mart, Inc., No. 2015 CA 007731 B, 2016 WL 
4080541 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 22, 2016) (denying the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss). 
 68. See Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 891 
F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018); McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954 (N.D. Cal. 
2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 462 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. 
Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.). 
 69. See Wirth v. Mars, Inc., No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx), 2016 WL 471234 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 5, 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 468 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Sud v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp., No. 15-cv-03783-JSW, 2016 WL 192569 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016), 
amended by 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 731 F. App’x 719 (9th Cir. 
2018) (mem.); Barber v. Nestle USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 
730 F. App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.). 
 70. See Nat’l Consumers League, 2016 WL 4080541, at *1.  The NCL “provides 
government, businesses, and other organizations with the consumer’s perspective on 
concerns including child labor, privacy, food safety, and medication information,” and its 
mission is “to protect and promote social and economic justice for consumers and workers 
in the United States and abroad.”  Mission, NCL, http://www.nclnet.org/mission (last 
visited June 1, 2019). 
 71. Nat’l Consumers League, 2016 WL 4080541, at *1. 
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Wal-Mart declared on its website “[t]he safety and well-being of 
workers across our supply chain is the Responsible Sourcing group’s 
top priority.”72  Wal-Mart also stated in its “Sourcing Standards & 
Resources” and “Standards for Suppliers” that its suppliers are 
contractually required to sign its Standards for Suppliers prior to 
production, comply with all applicable laws and regulations, and 
provide workers with a safe and healthy work environment.73  Wal-
Mart further stated that it conducts facility compliance audits 
through a “multi-color auditing” system every six to twenty-four 
months to monitor supplier compliance with its standards.74  The 
plaintiff alleged J.C. Penney and The Children’s Place had similar 
statements on their websites encouraging consumers to believe 
forced labor was not present in their supply chains because they used 
regularly implemented auditing procedures to detect and curb the 
use of forced labor.75  The plaintiff relied on the Rana Plaza building 
collapse as evidence that the Retail Defendants failed to comply with 
their corporate statements and failed to follow their audit 
procedures, both in violation of the CPPA.76 
As in the cases discussed below, the defendants moved to dismiss, 
arguing the corporate statements were aspirational and not actionable 
because no reasonable consumer would construe those statements as 
definitive promises of what the corporations will do.77  The court 
agreed, for the most part, holding most of the statements relied on by 
the NCL were aspirational in nature.78  Indeed, the court noted the 
reason the Retail Defendants have an auditing process is to check on 
                                               
 72. Complaint at 2, Nat’l Consumers League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2015 
CA 007731 B, (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 2015), 2015 WL 11237102 [hereinafter Nat’l 
Consumers League Complaint]. 
 73. Nat’l Consumers League, 2016 WL 4080541, at *3; see also Nat’l Consumers League 
Complaint, supra note 72, at 3 (describing Wal-Mart’s purported auditing process to verify 
compliance with the Standards for Suppliers).  The court went beyond some of the 
allegations in the plaintiff’s Complaint and examined the website of each defendant, 
finding that examining the corporate statements located online was similar to examining 
contracts attached to a complaint.  Nat’l Consumers League, 2016 WL 4080541, at *2 n.3. 
 74. Nat’l Consumers League, 2016 WL 4080541, at *3. 
 75. Id. at *2–4. 
 76. Id. at *5. 
 77. Id. at *7. 
 78. Id. at *10–11.  The court found that the plain language of the statements 
used qualifying language such as “expect,” “goal,” and “ask,” which demonstrated the 
aspirational nature of the statements, falling short of a consumer promise.  Id. at *11. 
2019] MITIGATING RISK, ERADICATING SLAVERY 1721 
 
whether suppliers are following their corporate statements, which 
presumes the possibility that some suppliers will violate the standards.79 
But the court denied the motion to dismiss as to the Retail 
Defendants’ auditing statements.  Under § 28-3904(e) of the CPPA, a 
false statement is not required to create actionable conduct; a false 
impression is sufficient.80  The court held the “in-depth descriptions 
and detailed statistics of the auditing process can influence the 
reasonable consumer’s purchasing decision.  If in reality no audits 
were done, then representations about the auditing process would be 
misleading to consumers purchasing merchandise.”81  Further, the 
statements describing the auditing process were specific and 
verifiable, removing them from the realm of puffery.82  Thus, the 
court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part as to the 
detailed descriptions of the supplier-auditing process.  The court 
cautioned that summary judgment proceedings might reveal an 
auditing process existed sufficient to conclude the internet 
descriptions were not misleading.83  As of the date of this publication, 
National Consumers League is the sole case based on my research that 
has survived a motion to dismiss based on false-advertising claims.  It 
appears that the case may have resolved during discovery based on a 
joint consent motion for judgment.84  The case is now closed. 
B.   The Chocolate Cases 
 Consumer plaintiffs filed at least six class actions alleging false-
advertising claims against domestic chocolate retailers for failing to 
disclose forced labor in their supply chain.85  In early 2018, Danell 
                                               
 79. Id. at *13. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at *15. 
 82. Id. at *16. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Order Granting Consent Joint Motion for Judgment and Bar, Nat’l Consumers 
League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2015 CA 007731 B (D.C. Super. Ct. July 14, 2017); see 
also Statement on Resolution of Lawsuit Against Walmart, JC Penney, and The Children’s Place, NCL, 
https://www.nclnet.org/resolution_walmart (last visited June 1, 2019). 
 85. In 2018, three actions were brought in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts.  See Hershey Co. Class Action Complaint, supra note 66, at 1; Mars, 
Inc. Class Action Complaint, supra note 66, at 1; Nestle USA, Inc. Class Action 
Complaint, supra note 66, at 1.  Previously, three actions were brought in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California in 2016.  See generally Dana v. 
Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 2016); McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. 
Supp. 3d 954 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. 
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Tomasella filed three class action lawsuits in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts against The Hershey Company, 
Nestlé USA, Inc., and Mars, Inc. alleging a violation of the 
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act and unjust enrichment from 
failing to disclose the use of child and slave labor in their supply 
chains to the consuming public.86  The district court granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims on the grounds that they 
have no duty to disclose forced labor in the supply chain, holding 
that “it is not plausible that Nestlé’s failure to disclose information 
about the labor practices in its supply chain at the point of sale could 
have the ‘capacity to mislead consumers, acting reasonably under the 
circumstances, to act differently from the way they otherwise would 
have acted.’”87  As discussed below, this was also a successful 
argument in defeating the chocolate and fisherman failure-to-disclose 
class actions asserted under California law.88  Given the logical fallacy 
in the court’s opinion (that failure to disclose information in labor 
practices in the supply at point of sale could have the capacity to 
mislead consumers), it is not surprising that the cases have been 
appealed.89  The open question before the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit will be whether, under Massachusetts’s Consumer 
Protection Law, the failure to disclose the likely use of child or slave 
labor “possesses a tendency to deceive” and “could reasonably be 
found to have caused a person to act differently from the way he [or 
she] otherwise would have acted.”90 
Similarly, consumer-plaintiffs filed three California class actions 
against Mars, Nestlé, and Hershey Co. in 2016.91  As discussed below, 
                                               
Cal. 2016).  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of each of the California 
Chocolate cases.  See generally McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 730 F. App’x. 462 (9th Cir. 
2018) (mem.); Dana v. Hershey Co., 730 F. App’x. 460 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); 
Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 86. See Hershey Co. Class Action Complaint, supra note 66, at 30–34; Mars, Inc. 
Class Action Complaint, supra note 66, ¶¶ 76–92; Nestle USA, Inc. Class Action 
Complaint, supra note 66, at 34–37. 
 87. Tomasella v. Nestle USA, Inc., Nos. 18-cv-10269-ADB, 18-cv-10359, 18-cv-
10360, 2019 WL 383884, at *5 (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2019) (emphasis added). 
 88. See infra Sections III.B, III.C. 
 89. See Tomasella v. Hershey Co., No. 19-1132 (1st Cir. Feb. 4, 2019). 
 90. Tomasella, 2019 WL 383884, at *5. 
 91. See Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 655 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. 
App’x 462 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 957 
(N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Hodsdon v. Mars, 
Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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those cases were dismissed because under California law there is no 
duty, as of yet, to disclose forced labor in the supply chain.92 
The factual background for all of the chocolate cases deserves 
some attention here.  The district court’s opinion in Hodsdon v. Mars, 
Inc., granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss begins with this 
acknowledgement:  “That children and forced laborers pick cocoa 
beans on a daily basis is indisputably an international tragedy.”93  
According to the complaint, cocoa beans used to make the 
defendants’ (here Mars, Inc.) chocolate come from the Ivory Coast, 
where children and forced laborers “wield dangerous tools, transport 
heavy loads, and face exposure to toxic substances.”94  Children often 
arrive at these farms having been sold to, or kidnapped by, traffickers.  
According to the complaint, “[t]he working conditions on the farms 
are deplorable.”95  Workers often do not receive pay, sleep in locked 
quarters, and fear physical abuse as punishment.96 
The domestic chocolate industry is aware of these abuses and has 
taken illusory measures to eradicate the worst forms of child labor on 
the cocoa farms.97  According to the complaint, the defendants 
acknowledge their failure to achieve a certification system to 
eradicate the worst forms of child labor and have an aspirational goal 
of achieving certified sourcing by 2020.98  Mars does not disclose this 
information about its chocolate suppliers on the labels or 
advertisements of most of its chocolate products, such as M&M’s, 
Snickers, and Milky Way bars.99 
The plaintiffs in the three California cases asserted class action 
claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Consumers 
Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and False Advertising Act (FAL) based on 
the allegation that he or she would not have purchased, or paid as 
much money for, the defendants’ chocolate products had the labels 
included disclosures about the labor practices of the defendants’ 
                                               
 92. See infra notes 100–26 and accompanying text. 
 93. Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1019.  Hodsdon is the seminal decision in the 
chocolate cases, but similar claims have been asserted against the other major 
chocolate retailers in the United States. 
 94. Id. at 1020. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Mars does make Dove chocolates, which state the cocoa is purchased from 
Rainforest Alliance Certified farms.  See id. 
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suppliers.100  The cases were dismissed for failure to state a claim under 
California’s consumer protection laws.101  The courts agreed the 
plaintiffs had standing to pursue these claims even though the plaintiff 
could not trace any of the purchased chocolate to a specific farm, and 
the plaintiff did not allege he relied on the omitted information in 
purchasing the product.102  The Hodsdon court held the plaintiff’s 
allegation that he would not have purchased, or would have paid less 
for the product, had he known that cocoa harvested by children and 
forced laborers was in the supply chain was sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement that he suffer an injury in fact.103 
The mainstay of the court’s dismissal of the UCL, CLRA, and FAL 
claims was the court’s holding that there is no duty to disclose 
information about labor practices in the a supply chain.104  California 
courts have generally rejected a broad obligation to disclose, except 
for omissions needed to correct a representation made by the 
defendant or when the non-disclosure posed a safety risk or 
concerned a product defect.105  The duty to disclose does not extend 
to situations where the information may persuade the customer to 
make a different purchasing decision.106  Here, there was no 
misrepresentation about forced labor in the defendants’ supply 
chain; to the contrary, information regarding the potential child-
labor practices is readily available on Mars’s website.107  And while 
sourcing products derived from child labor may be deplorable, the 
plaintiff did not allege it posed a safety risk to consumers or 
constituted a product defect.  Thus, there was no duty to disclose. 
                                               
 100. See Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 655–56 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 
730 F. App’x 462 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 
954, 957 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Hodsdon, 
162 F. Supp. 3d at 1019. 
 101. See Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 670; McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 972; Hodsdon, 162 
F. Supp. 3d at 1029. 
 102. See Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 660–61, 663; McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 962, 964; 
Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1022. 
 103. Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1022; accord Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 663 (“It is 
plausible that a consumer would place less value on a product produced from a 
supply chain involving severe labor abuses.”); McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 964 (“[I]f a 
customer has paid a premium for an assurance that a product meets certain 
standards, and the assurance turns out to be meaningless, the premium that the 
customer has paid is an actual, personal, particularized injury . . . .”). 
 104. Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1029. 
 105. Id. at 1025–26.  
 106. Id. at 1026. 
 107. Id. at 1027. 
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The plaintiffs appealed.108  In Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc.,109 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ claims.  The court held that manufacturers do not have a 
duty, under California law, to disclose forced labor or child labor, 
“even though they are reprehensible, because they are not physical 
defects that affect the central function of the chocolate products.”110  
The court, somewhat begrudgingly, acknowledged that California 
state court precedent suggested that a duty to disclose is not limited 
to (1) correcting a misrepresentation, or (2) a safety hazard.111  
However, in analyzing those more expansive cases, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that in the absence of an affirmative misrepresentation, 
there is a duty to disclose only when the defect goes to the central 
function of the product.112  Even assuming that child labor in the 
supply chain is material to consumers, the court held that the lack of 
disclosure about child labor is “not a physical defect at all, much less 
one related to the chocolate’s function as chocolate.”113  As the court 
noted:  “A computer chip that corrupts the hard drive, or a laptop 
screen that goes dark, renders those products incapable of use by any 
consumer; some consumers of chocolate are not concerned about 
the labor practices used to manufacture the product.”114  Thus, the 
manufacturers had no duty to disclose under the CLRA or the FAL. 
California’s UCL prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business 
acts or practices.115  The plaintiffs alleged unsuccessfully that the 
defendant violated the unlawful business act prong of the UCL 
through its violation of the CLRA, which, as discussed above, failed.116 
They also argued the failure to disclose child labor in the supply of 
cocoa beans violated the unfair business practice prong of the UCL.117  
                                               
 108. The chocolate cases and the fisherman cases discussed below were 
consolidated for oral argument.  See, e.g., Wirth v. Mars, Inc., 730 F. App’x 468, 468 
n.1 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem). 
 109. 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 110. Id. at 860. 
 111. Id. at 863. 
 112. Id.  The court noted that the duty might be even more limited, such that the 
defect goes to the central function of the product and will arise during the warranty 
period.  Id.  The court also acknowledged that there may be a separate duty to disclose 
safety hazards that do not go to the product’s central function.  Id. at 863 n.3. 
 113. Id. at 864. 
 114. Id. 
 115. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2018). 
 116. Hodsdon, 891 F.3d at 865. 
 117. Id. at 866. 
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The court also rejected this argument.118  The Hodsdon court noted 
that the precise contours of an “unfair” business practice under the 
UCL are in flux, setting forth two definitions of an “unfair” business 
practice.  Something is “unfair” when it (1) “offends an established 
public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, 
unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers,”119 or (2) is 
tethered to a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision.120  The 
court applied both tests. 
Under the “tethering” test, the plaintiffs argued that the claims 
were tied to the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) 
Convention 182 (“Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention”)—the 
former forbidding slavery and the latter forbidding the worst forms of 
child labor.121  But the court held that the labeling of products is “too 
far removed from the UN and ILO policies to serve as the basis for a 
UCL claim.  As such, the UN Convention and the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention do not provide a tether here.”122  Further, the court 
hypothesized that requiring Mars to place labels on its products could 
impinge on California’s Supply Chains Act, which requires that 
companies disclose on their websites efforts to monitor for forced labor 
in the supply chain but does not require product labels.123 
The court also held Mars’s alleged failure to disclose its chocolate 
likely contained products harvested by child labor and forced labor 
was not immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially 
injurious to consumers.124  The court remarked, 
While the labor practices themselves are clearly immoral, it is 
doubtful that failing to disclose on the label that a product may be 
tainted by such labor practices is itself immoral, especially when 
there is no specific duty to disclose this information and the 
information is otherwise disclosed under the Supply Chains Act.125 
                                               
 118. Id. at 867. 
 119. Id. at 866 (quoting Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1169 
(9th Cir. 2012)). 
 120. Id. (citing Davis, 691 F.3d at 1169–70). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 867. 
 123. Id.  California’s Supply Chains Act requires retailers and manufacturers with 
more than $100,000,000 in gross receipts to disclose their efforts to eradicate slavery 
and human trafficking from their direct supply chain for tangible goods.  CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1714.43 (West 2018). 
 124. Hodsdon, 891 F.3d at 867. 
 125. Id. 
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Further, the failure to disclose was not substantially injurious 
because, as mentioned above, information about slave and child 
labor is public knowledge and accessible on Mars’ website—pursuant 
to the Supply Chains Act.126 
C.   The Fishermen Cases 
The fishermen cases alleged similar legal claims to those in the 
chocolate cases.127  According to the complaints, small fishing boats 
in waters between Thailand and Indonesia were reported by the U.S. 
Department of Labor for implementing forced labor.128  These small 
ships—“ghost ships”—deliver payloads of fish to “motherships” 
operated by Thai Union Frozen Products PCL, the Thai partner to 
the defendants in the fisherman cases.129  The Thai Union then uses 
the fish either as feed (e.g., for prawn food), or delivers the fish to the 
U.S. companies directly (e.g., for use in cat food or tuna fish).130  The 
plaintiffs in these cases alleged dangerous and inhumane working 
conditions on the small fishing vessels carrying payloads to the Thai 
Union motherships, and that they would not have purchased the 
defendants’ products if they knew of the labor abuses.131 
In Sud v. Costco,132 the court dismissed for lack of standing without 
needing to reach the false advertising claims.133  The plaintiffs alleged 
prawns purchased from Costco were fed with fish sourced from Thai 
suppliers committing labor abuses.134  The Sud court held the plaintiffs 
had not rebutted evidence put forth by the defendant that the prawns 
                                               
 126. Id. 
 127. See Wirth v. Mars, Inc., No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx), 2016 WL 471234, at 
*1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 468 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Sud v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 15-cv-03783-JSW, 2016 WL 192569, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan 
15, 2016), amended by 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 731 F. App’x 719 
(9th Cir. 2018)(mem.); Barber v. Nestle USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954, 956 (C.D. 
Cal. 2015), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2018)(mem.). 
 128. See Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *1; Sud, 2016 WL 192569, at *1; Barber, 154 F. 
Supp. 3d at 956–57. 
 129. See Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *1; see also Barber, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 957. 
 130. See Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *1; Sud, 2016 WL 192569, at *1; Barber, 154 F. 
Supp. 3d at 956–57. 
 131. See Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *1; Sud, 2016 WL 192569, at *1, *3; Barber, 154 
F. Supp. 3d at 957. 
 132. No. 15-cv-03783-JSW, 2016 WL 192569 (N.D. Cal. Jan 15, 2016). 
 133. Id. at *3. 
 134. Id. at *1. 
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purchased as the basis for the plaintiffs’ claim were not sourced in 
Thailand.135  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.136   
In Wirth v. Mars, Inc.,137 the court reached a similar holding on the 
false advertising claims as the courts addressing the chocolate cases:  
there is no duty to disclose information concerning the likelihood of 
forced labor in the supply chain when defendants have not made a 
false representation and the omission does not concern product 
safety.138  The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision based on Hodsdon.139 
Finally, the plaintiffs in Barber v. Nestle USA, Inc.140 alleged Nestlé’s 
online statements about its supply-chain principles were misleading.141  
For example, Nestlé’s website had the statement, “Nestlé requires its 
supplies [sic], agents, subcontractors and their employees to 
demonstrate honesty, integrity and fairness, and to adhere to the 
Nestlé Supplier Code of Conduct.”142  Nestlé responded by arguing 
these statements are aspirational, and that it acknowledges not all 
suppliers will immediately meet these requirements.143  The court held 
no reasonable consumer who reads the documents in context could 
conclude Nestlé’s suppliers comply with Nestlé’s requirements in all 
circumstances; to the contrary, the guidelines suggest Nestlé anticipates a 
certain level of noncompliance.144  Therefore, the court held the plaintiffs 
failed to state a misrepresentation claim on the basis of these statements.  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the basis of Hodsdon.145 
The next set of cases involves claims asserted by the actual workers, 
as opposed to consumer statements based on false advertising. 
                                               
 135. Id.  The defense presented evidence the prawn feed at issue was sourced in 
Vietnam or Indonesia.  Id.  The plaintiffs were alleging the labor abuses were within a 
Thai supply line.  Id. 
 136. 731 F. App’x 719 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 137. No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx), 2016 WL 471234 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016), 
aff’d, 730 F. App’x 468 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.).  
 138. Id. at *5. 
 139. Wirth v. Mars, Inc., 730 F. App’x 468, 468 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.). 
 140. 154 F. Supp. 3d 954 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.). 
 141. Id. at 956. 
 142. Id. at 963 (alterations omitted). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 964. 
 145. Barber v. Nestle USA, Inc., 730 F. App’x 464, 465 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.). 
2019] MITIGATING RISK, ERADICATING SLAVERY 1729 
 
IV.    EMPLOYEE CASES:  THE VIABILITY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
AND THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT 
AGAINST DOMESTIC ENTITIES 
More recent employee/plaintiff cases have asserted claims under 
the ATS and the TVPRA.  These cases involve employees of a supplier 
in the downside supply chain suing a U.S. entity who allegedly 
benefitted from the supplier’s use of forced labor.  But jurisdiction 
under the ATS is virtually closed to claimants seeking to recover for 
foreign acts that occurred under foreign soil,146 or those seeking to 
recover against foreign corporations.147  The TVPRA, in contrast, has 
an expansive and explicit exterritorial jurisdictional grant.148 
A.   The Alien Tort Statute as a Basis for Liability Against Domestic Corporations 
The ATS provides, “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”149  
The Supreme Court has limited application of the ATS in several 
ways, but for our purposes, the most significant limitation is that 
imposed by the presumption against extraterritoriality.150  Doe I v. 
Nestle USA, Inc.151 demonstrates the legal wrangling under the ATS.152  
The Nestle plaintiffs filed suit in 2005 against domestic cocoa 
purchasers alleging they aided and abetted child slavery by providing 
assistance to farmers on the Ivory Coast in violation of the ATS.153  
                                               
 146. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013) (barring 
claims asserted under the ATS when the violations occurred outside the United 
States, due to the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
 147. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1408 (2018) (“For these reasons, 
judicial deference requires that any imposition of corporate liability on foreign 
corporations for violations of international law must be determined in the first 
instance by the political branches of the Government.”). 
 148. 18 U.S.C. § 1596 (2012). 
 149. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 150. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117. 
 151. 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 152. Id. at 1027–28. 
 153. Id. at 1016.  The court summarized the allegations: 
The plaintiffs in this case are three victims of child slavery.  They were forced 
to work on Ivorian cocoa plantations for up to fourteen hours per day six 
days a week, given only scraps of food to eat, and whipped and beaten by 
overseers.  They were locked in small rooms at night and not permitted to 
leave the plantations, knowing that children who tried to escape would be 
beaten or tortured.  Plaintiff John Doe II witnessed guards cut open the feet 
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The plaintiffs alleged the defendants provided money, equipment, and 
training to Ivorian farmers, knowing these provisions would facilitate 
the use of forced child labor.154  The district court granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that corporations could not 
be sued under the ATS and that the plaintiffs failed to allege a claim 
for aiding and abetting slave labor.155  The plaintiffs appealed. 
Under Supreme Court precedent, federal courts are available to 
hear tort claims based on violations of international law:  “[F]ederal 
common law creates tort liability for violations of international legal 
norms, and the ATS in turn provides federal courts with jurisdiction 
to hear these hybrid common law—international law tort claims.”156  
The Ninth Circuit permitted this case to go forward against the 
corporate defendants (as opposed to states), in holding “the 
prohibition against slavery is universal” and does not only apply to 
nation-states.157  But the defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ claim 
sought an extraterritorial application of federal law barred by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.158  This is 
potentially the strongest defense to ATS claims based on supply-side 
forced labor.  In Kiobel, the Court held prudential concerns about 
judicial interference in foreign policy are particularly strong in ATS 
litigation and concluded that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
thus constrains courts exercising their power under the ATS.159  But 
here, the claims were asserted against domestic corporations. 
Rather than attempt to elucidate the Supreme Court’s precedent 
on the proper test for extraterritorial restraint under the ATS, the 
                                               
of children who attempted to escape, and John Doe III knew that the guards 
forced failed escapees to drink urine. 
Id. at 1017.  The plaintiffs also raised claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act 
(TVPA) and state law negligence and unjust enrichment claims.  See Doe v. Nestle, 
S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 2010), rev’d, 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 
2014).  The plaintiffs conceded the state law claims were foreclosed by Doe I v. Wal-
Mart Stores.  Id. at 1120–21 (citing 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009)).  The court dismissed 
the TVPA claims because (1) the Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts from which 
it could infer that the Defendants aided and abetted torture; (2) corporations could 
not be held liable under the TVPRA (an issue that was in conflict in the courts); and 
(3) the complaint failed to allege facts from which it could be reasonably inferred 
that the Ivorian farmers acted under “color of law.”  Id. at 1120. 
 154. Doe I v. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1017. 
 155. Id. at 1018. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1022. 
 158. 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Doe I v. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1027. 
 159. Kiobel, 596 U.S. at 116, 124. 
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Ninth Circuit remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend 
their complaint in light of Kiobel.160  But the district court then 
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, based on the two-step framework 
for the extraterritorial analysis of claims imposed by the Supreme 
Court in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community161: 
Morrison and Kiobel reflect a two-step framework for analyzing extra 
territoriality issues.  At the first step, we ask whether the 
presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, 
whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it 
applies extraterritorially.  We must ask this question regardless of 
whether the statute in question regulates conduct, affords relief, or 
merely confers jurisdiction.  If the statute is not extraterritorial, 
then at the second step we determine whether the case involves a 
domestic application of the statute, and we do this by looking to 
the statute’s “focus.”  If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus 
occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissible 
domestic application even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if 
the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, 
then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application 
regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.162 
Applying the “focus test” under the second step of the analysis, the 
district court found that the conduct relevant to the focus of the 
ATS—the child-slave labor in the chocolate industry—occurred in 
the Ivory Coast.163  The court rejected the theory that corporate 
supervision of those foreign acts was sufficient to rebut the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.164 
The plaintiffs appealed again to the Ninth Circuit.  During the 
pendency of the appeal, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court held, in 
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,165 that the ATS does not impose liability on 
foreign corporations for human rights violations.166  This decision 
                                               
 160. Doe I v. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1028–29.  But see Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 95 
F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1018 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (precluding human trafficking claim under 
ATS based on extraterritorial action). 
 161. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
 162. Nestle v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133-SVW-MRW, 2017 WL 6059134, at *2 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2017) (quoting RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2101), rev’d sub nom., 
Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 163. Id. at *8. 
 164. Id. 
 165. 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). 
 166. Id. at 1408 (“For these reasons, judicial deference requires that any 
imposition of corporate liability on foreign corporations for violations of 
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forecloses ATS liability for forced labor abuses against foreign 
corporations but not domestic entities that profit from forced labor in the 
supply chain.167  The Nestle plaintiffs, in this case that was filed over 
thirteen years ago, had alleged several foreign corporations as defendants 
and discussed the domestic and foreign defendants as a single block.168  
The Court’s decision in Jesner required that those claims be dismissed.  
Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded to allow the plaintiffs to 
amend their pleadings to accommodate the change in the law.169 
But the Ninth Circuit also addressed the district court’s decision 
that the principal against extraterritorial application of the ATS 
precluded the plaintiffs’ claims.170  The court agreed that RJR Nabisco 
requires a two-step inquiry for ATS claims.171  Under the second step, 
the court must look to the statute’s focus to determine whether the 
case involves a domestic application of the statute.172  The court 
disagreed with the defendants’ argument that the analysis should 
focus on the location where the principal offense or the injury 
occurred, rather than the location of where any aiding or abetting 
took place.173  The court held that it must decide whether there is any 
domestic conduct (such as aiding or abetting) relevant to the 
statute’s focus that occurred in the United States, which would be a 
permissible domestic application.174 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held the plaintiffs 
had alleged domestic conduct sufficient to state a claim within the 
ATS’s focus.175  The specific domestic conduct that the court found 
sufficient was that the defendants allegedly provided “‘personal 
spending money to maintain the farmers’ and/or the cooperatives’ 
                                               
international law must be determined in the first instance by the political branches of 
the Government.”). 
 167. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 168. See generally Complaint, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. 2:05-CV-05133 (C.D. Cal. July 
14, 2005). 
 169. Doe v. Nestle, 906 F.3d at 1127. 
 170. Id. at 1126–27. 
 171. Id. at 1124–25. 
 172. Id. at 1125.  The court first asked whether the ATS “gives a “clear, affirmative 
indication that it applies extraterritorially.”  Id. (quoting RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European 
Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2094 (2016)).  In Kiobel, the Supreme Court answered that 
question, holding that the “presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims 
under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”  Id. (quoting 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013)). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1125–26. 
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loyalty as an exclusive supplier.”176  The court inferred that the 
spending money was outside the ordinary business contract and was 
given with the purpose of maintaining ongoing relationships with the 
farms “so the defendants could continue receiving cocoa at a price 
that would not be obtainable without employing child slave labor.”177  
Providing personal spending money to maintain a relationship was 
more akin to “kickbacks” than ordinary business conduct, reasoned 
the court.178  Additionally, the defendants “had employees from their 
United States headquarters regularly inspect operations in the Ivory 
Coast and report back to the United States offices, where these 
financing decisions . . . originated.”179  In sum, “the allegations 
paint[ed] a picture of overseas slave labor that defendants 
perpetuated from headquarters in the United States.”180  Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit is the sole federal court of appeals to permit an ATS 
claim by foreign employees against domestic corporations to survive a 
motion to dismiss based on an analysis that domestic funding is 
sufficient to state a claim regarding domestic action.  The case will be 
remanded to district court (unless the defendants seek certiorari to 
the U.S. Supreme Court) with leave for the plaintiffs to file an 
amended complaint.  This case will be closely watched by those 
seeking to litigate claims based on forced labor in the supply chain. 
Other courts have not interpreted the ATS as broadly as the Ninth 
Circuit.  In Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners,181 the families of thirteen Nepali 
citizens alleged defendants Kellogg, Brown, & Root (“KBR”) and Daoud 
& Partners engaged in a scheme to traffic the plaintiffs from Nepal to 
Iraq, where one KBR subsidiary served as a contractor with the U.S. 
government to perform specific duties at U.S. military facilities.182 
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants “‘established, engaged 
and/or contracted with a network of suppliers, agents, and/or 
partners in order to procure laborers from third world countries.’”183  
The deceased plaintiffs were recruited from Nepal, after being told 
they would be working in a luxury hotel in Jordan or in an U.S. 
                                               
 176. Id. at 1126.  
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. 95 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
 182. Id. at 1016. 
 183. Id. 
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camp.184  None of the men were led to believe their work would be in 
a dangerous area.185  They were promised a salary of $500 per 
month.186  After they were recruited, the deceased plaintiffs were 
transferred to a Jordanian job brokerage company where they first 
learned they were being sent to work in Iraq.187  They also learned 
they would be paid a fraction of what they were initially promised.188  
Although they wanted to return home to Nepal, the men were 
compelled to proceed to Iraq because of the debts their families had 
assumed to pay the brokers.189  Daoud transported the victims to Iraq 
via automobile caravan, where they were captured by an Iraqi 
insurgent group.190  The insurgent group posted internet pictures of 
the victims’ capture, and those images were broadcast on Nepali 
television.191  The deceased plaintiffs described being “captives in 
Jordan” and not knowing when they would die.192  The insurgent 
group executed the men while videotaping the executions.193  Their 
families saw the videos.194  Their bodies were never found.195 
The plaintiffs, families of the victims, asserted Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), TVPRA, ATS, 
and negligence claims against the defendants.196  The court dismissed 
the negligence claims as barred by the statute of limitations.197  The 
court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants on the 
RICO and ATS claims based on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, and in favor of defendant Daoud on the TVPRA 
claim because it was never present in the United States, meaning it is 
not within the TVPRA’s extraterritoriality jurisdiction provision.198  
                                               
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 1016–17. 
 191. Id. at 1017. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2013 WL 4511354, at *1–3 
(S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 197. Id. at *3. 
 198. Id. at *7–9; see also Adhikari, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 1022 (denying rehearing on ATS and 
TVPRA claims against KBR and reaffirming finding of preclusion based on 
extraterritoriality principles).  The TVPRA portion of the case is discussed infra Section IV.B. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ATS 
and TVPRA claims.199  The court held the principle against 
extraterritoriality precluded the ATS claims, and affirmed the district 
court’s denial of leave to amend the pleadings to allege domestic-
based conduct.200  The court held that, for the deceased plaintiffs, 
the recruitment, transportation, and alleged detention . . . all 
occurred in Nepal, Jordan, and Iraq . . . .  Thus, none of this 
overseas conduct relevant to their trafficking claim—even 
assuming . . . it can be imputed to KBR—could support the 
conclusion that Plaintiffs seek to apply the ATS domestically.201 
The plaintiffs argued that the U.S. based conduct rebutting the 
presumption against extraterritoriality included the following:  KBR’s 
payment to Daoud, the contractor who hired the deceased plaintiffs 
and Plaintiff Gurung; and Houston-based employees’ awareness of 
allegations of human trafficking at KBR’s worksites.202  In an 
application that differs starkly from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Doe, the Fifth Circuit held that the ATS’s focus is the violation of 
international law—here all the conduct comprising the international 
law violations happened in a foreign country.203  The plaintiffs did 
not connect the financial payments to the human trafficking or 
demonstrate that the U.S. based employees actually engaged in the 
trafficking.204  The court found the allegation that U.S. employees 
may have known of allegations of human rights abuse insufficient to 
raise an issue of genuine fact that the employees were directly liable 
for violating international law.205  Thus, Adhikari creates a schism with 
Doe for a case in which financial benefit domestically was not 
sufficient to provide the predicate domestic act to overcome the 
presumption against extraterritorial application for ATS claims. 
Judge Graves dissented from the majority’s decision on the ATS 
claims, opining that the majority misinterpreted the applicable 
                                               
 199. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 190 (5th Cir. 2017), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 134 (2017). 
 200. Id. at 199–200. 
 201. Id. at 195.  The court also decided that KBR’s conduct on Al Asad, a military 
base, did not constitute domestic conduct relevant to the ATS claims.  Id. at 197. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 198. 
 205. Id. 
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relevant conduct under the “focus” test.206  Judge Graves aptly noted 
the defendant was a U.S. corporation, which should have some 
pertinence in determining whether domestic conduct is at issue.207  In 
the words of Judge Graves: 
Given the proliferation of international agreements condemning 
human trafficking and forced labor, surely these foreign policy 
concerns are no less pertinent in the present day.  Among several 
international accords concerning trafficking, the United States has 
signed and ratified a treaty that asks signatories to hold their citizens 
responsible for transnational trafficking.  Human trafficking has 
been condemned as a modern-day form of slavery.  The slave trader, 
like the pirate, is “hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”  
And just as a nation that harbored pirates provoked the concern of 
other nations in past centuries, so harboring ‘common enemies of 
all mankind’ provokes similar concerns today. 
These foreign policy concerns are particularly heightened where, as 
here, the defendant’s conduct directly implicates the United States and 
its military. KBR was one of the largest U.S. military contractors 
operating in Iraq. While KBR was allegedly exploiting trafficked labor at 
Al Asad, the U.S. government and military were engaged in an 
aggressive anti-trafficking campaign.  “Contractors provide crucial 
support for the U.S. military and are perceived internationally as an 
extension of the military.” Congress repeatedly expressed concern that 
failure to hold U.S. military contractors accountable for human 
trafficking overseas undermines U.S. foreign policy. 
This case substantially implicates the interests of the United States, 
both domestically and abroad. While these considerable connections 
to the United States may not be dispositive to the extraterritoriality 
inquiry, they are of critical importance to analyzing the focus of the 
ATS. At a minimum, they counsel a hard look at any domestic 
conduct alleged on the part of the defendant. It simply contravenes 
the focus of the ATS to disregard these facts entirely.208 
Judge Graves essentially makes the argument that a domestic 
company can engage in conduct abroad that should give rise to 
extraterritorial application of the ATS.  The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on October 2, 2017.209 
                                               
 206. Id. at 207–08. 
 207. Id. at 209. 
 208. Id. at 210–11. 
 209. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, 138 S. Ct. 134 (2017). 
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Similarly, in Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co.,210 the plaintiffs, 
Cambodian seafood factory workers, asserted TVPRA and ATS claims 
against Thai seafood suppliers Phatthana Seafood Co. and S.S. 
Frozen Food Co.; United States seafood distributor Rubicon 
Resources LLC, which allegedly distributed seafood as part of a single 
enterprise for Phatthana; and Wales & Co. Universe Ltd., a Thai 
company registered to do business in California.211  The plaintiffs 
alleged they were deceived into forced labor and unsanitary working 
conditions through fraudulent promises of good jobs and forced into 
servitude when Thai factory managers confiscated their passports.212  
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the TVPRA’s 
extraterritorial jurisdiction does not extend to these defendants and 
is limited to criminal prosecutions.213  The defendants also argued the 
court lacked jurisdiction over the ATS claims, and that the plaintiffs 
failed to state a claim under the TVPRA or ATS.214 
The district court denied the motion to dismiss regarding the 
TVPRA claims and, not surprisingly, granted it as to the ATS 
claims.215  The court held the presumption against extraterritoriality 
limited the reach of ATS jurisdiction, following Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.216  Despite an alleged degree of corporate presence for 
the two domestic defendants, all of the alleged activities forming the 
basis of the ATS claims occurred in Cambodia and Thailand.217  Thus, 
the court held it did not have jurisdiction under the ATS.218  The 
court explained, 
                                               
 210. No. CV 16-4271-JFW (ASX), 2017 WL 8292922 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017). 
 211. Id. at *1–2. 
 212. Complaint at 1, Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. 2:16-cv-04271 (C.D. Cal. 
June 15, 2016).  The workers allege they were paid less than promised and had fees 
deducted for housing, fees and other charges.  Id.  They also allege they worked long 
hours and were packed into unsanitary and crowded housing.  When the villagers tried 
to return home, they could not get their passports back. Some workers could not make 
enough money after working six days a week to afford food and were forced to eat 
seafood that had washed up on the beach.  Those who returned home faced more 
extreme poverty for losing the land they had put up as collateral.  Id. at 1–2. 
 213. Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. CV 16-4271-JFW (ASx), 2016 WL 
11020222, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2016). 
 214. Id. at *4. 
 215. Id. at *8.  For a discussion on the resolution of the TVPRA claims, see infra 
Section IV.A. 
 216. See Ratha, 2016 WL 11020222, at *7–8 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)). 
 217. Id. at *6. 
 218. Id. at *8. 
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In this case, the alleged tort is human trafficking which occurred in 
Cambodia and Thailand.  Even assuming that all of the Defendants 
have some corporate presence in the United States (either directly 
or through the joint venture and agency relationship between the 
Defendants), the activities at issue in this action—allegedly 
recruiting and then entrapping third country nationals as cheap 
labor for Thai seafood factories—unquestionably occurred on 
foreign soil.  This is the type of case—where all the allegedly 
tortious conduct took place on foreign soil and the only 
connection to the United States is a defendant’s “mere corporate 
presence”—which the Supreme Court held in Kiobel is insufficient 
to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.219 
In contrast to the ATS claims, the plaintiffs have generally fared better 
in overcoming jurisdictional obstacles by stating claims under the TVPRA. 
B.  Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act Claims 
More recently, employee-victims are asserting foreign forced labor 
claims under the TVPRA in conjunction with Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS) claims.  The TVPRA is a criminal statute that also carries a 
private right of action for a civil remedy.  The TVPRA, in contrast to 
the ATS, has a known purpose coupled with a broad jurisdictional 
grant.  The TVPRA’s objectives are to combat the growing issue of 
human trafficking in the commercial sex industry, modern slavery, 
and forced labor.220  The TVPRA provides criminal penalties for: 
Whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, 
from participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or 
obtaining of labor or services by any of the means described in subsection 
(a) [enumerating acts of forced labor], knowing or in reckless disregard 
of the fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or obtaining of 
labor or services by any of such means . . . .221 
The TVPRA criminalizes other conduct, such as child sex 
trafficking,222 trafficking or engaging in forced labor, slavery, 
involuntary servitude or peonage,223 and possession or destruction of 
passports or government documents in furtherance of those acts.224  
The key provision that would concern most domestic companies that 
                                               
 219. Id. 
 220. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012) (outlining the purpose of the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act). 
 221. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b). 
 222. § 1591. 
 223. § 1590. 
 224. § 1592(a). 
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have known forced labor or child labor in the supply chain should be 
§ 1589.  That section, set forth above, makes it a criminal act to 
knowingly benefit financially from participation in a venture engaged 
in forced labor, if that participation was in knowing or reckless 
disregard of the fact that the venture had engaged in the unlawful 
act.225  The TVPRA provides victims of these criminal acts a civil 
remedy against a perpetrator or “whoever knowingly benefits, 
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a 
venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged 
in an act in violation of [the TVPRA].”226 
In 2008, Congress amended the TVPRA to give it an extraterritorial 
application.  Section 1596, titled “Additional jurisdiction in certain 
trafficking offenses,” states: 
(a) IN GENERAL.—In addition to any domestic or extra-territorial 
jurisdiction otherwise provided by law, the courts of the United 
States have extra-territorial jurisdiction over any offense (or any 
attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense) under section 1581, 
1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, or 1591 if— 
(1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States or an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as those terms 
are defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(8 U.S.C. 1101)); or 
(2) an alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective 
of the nationality of the alleged offender.227 
One of the enumerated predicates for jurisdiction under § 1596 is 
§ 1589, which, set forth above, makes actionable mere benefit, 
instead of active procurement of forced labor or child labor.228 
This express grant of extraterritorial application means that, at 
least facially, the TVPRA should not face the same extraterritorial 
obstacles in holding domestic entities liable for profiting from 
reckless disregard of forced labor practices in a foreign country as did 
the ATS.  So far, courts have permitted a TVPRA claim based on 
allegations of foreign forced labor to move forward whereas the ATS 
claim could not.229 
                                               
 225. § 1589(b). 
 226. § 1595(a). 
 227. § 1596. 
 228. § 1589(b). 
 229. See, e.g., Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 204 (5th Cir. 
2017) (“Prior to § 1596, a private party could not maintain a civil cause of action under 
the TVPRA for forced labor or human trafficking that occurred overseas.  . . .  After 
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Take, for example, Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co.230  Although the 
district court dismissed the ATS claims based on the presumption 
against extraterritorial reach, it denied the motion to dismiss the 
TVPRA claims.231  The defendants argued (1) the TVPRA’s 
extraterritorial jurisdictional grant is limited to criminal actions; (2) 
the jurisdictional grant applies only to individuals, not corporations;232 
and (3) the presumption against extraterritoriality deprived the court 
of subject-matter jurisdiction because all the alleged violations 
occurred off domestic soil (Cambodia and Thailand).233 
The district court rejected each argument as to the TVPRA claims.  
The court noted that Congress added the jurisdictional expansion to 
the 2008 reauthorization only after two courts considering TVPRA 
suits had held the provisions were not intended to be extraterritorial.  
According to the court, “Congress has clearly indicated that it intends 
the TVPRA . . . to be a unified statutory scheme of interlocking 
provisions that provides extraterritorial jurisdiction over specific 
predicate offenses and further expressly provides for restitution and a 
civil remedy whenever a court in the United States has that 
jurisdiction.”234  In rejecting the defendants’ argument that the 
extraterritorial grant applies only to criminal conduct, the court noted 
that argument has been “overwhelmingly rejected by the courts.”235 
                                               
§ 1596’s enactment, a TVPRA defendant in a civil suit could no longer rely on a 
previously available defense:  the presumption against extraterritoriality.”), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 134 (2017).  The Fifth Circuit held that the Adhikari plaintiffs could not state 
a claim under the TVPRA because the events occurred prior to the 2008 extraterritorial 
grant added to the TVPRA and because it did not have retroactive effect.  Id. at 204–06. 
 230. See supra notes 210–20 and accompanying text (providing the facts of Ratha). 
 231. Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. CV 16-4271-JFW (ASx), 2016 WL 
11020222, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2016). 
 232. In Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, the Supreme Court held that the term 
“individual,” as used in the Torture Victim Protection Act (not to be confused with 
the Trafficking Victim Protection Act), only imposed liability on natural persons and 
not on corporations.  556 U.S. 449, 451–52 (2012).  The district court in Doe v. Nestle, 
S.A. dismissed the TVPA claims, in part, on this basis.  748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1116 
(C.D. Cal. 2010), rev’d, 776 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 233. See Ratha, 2016 WL 11020222, at *5, *6 (addressing the defendants’ three arguments). 
 234. Id. at *5. 
 235. Id. at *6 (citing Aguilera v. Aegis Commc’ns Grp., 72 F. Supp. 3d 975, 979 
(W.D. Mo. 2014); Doe v. Howard, No. 1:11-cv-1105, 2012 WL 383487, at *2 (E.D. Va. 
Sept 4, 2012) (“entering default judgment for the plaintiff and allowing remedy 
pursuant to Section 1595 for trafficking in Yemen and Japan”); Adhikari v. Daoud & 
Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 683 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (applying civil remedies)).  Doe 
v. Howard, No. 1:11-cv-1105, 2012 WL 383487, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept 4, 2012); Adhikari 
v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 683 (S.D. Tex. 2009)). 
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The defendants’ stronger argument was that the TVPRA’s extraterritorial 
jurisdiction grant applies only to individuals.  The court recognized 
§ 1596(a)(1) is limited to individuals because it incorporates definitions of a 
U.S. national and an alien lawfully admitted.236  But the court held 
§ 1596(a)(2)’s use of the term “offender” (present in the United States) 
applied to individuals and corporations.237  The court reasoned the use of 
the term “person” in the remainder of § 1596 confirms that corporations 
are covered by the statute.238  Note, the emphasis on “present” in the United 
States could prove problematic for enforcement against non-domestic 
entities, as could the Supreme Court’s recent activity limiting the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over foreign companies.239 
Finally, the district court rejected the argument that it lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction because all the events occurred in other 
countries.  Section 1596 requires only that an offender be “present” 
in the United States.240  This applies to the Delaware corporation and 
was not disputed as to a defendant holding a California office.  
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued these two entities benefitted 
financially from the forced labor in the United States; thus, the court 
held that extraterritorial jurisdiction was not implicated.241 
However, the defendants argued that each defendant must be present 
in the United States for the court to have subject-matter jurisdiction, and 
                                               
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at *6–7. 
 238. Id. at *7. 
 239. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (holding the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation from conduct that occurred abroad unless 
“the corporation’s affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant 
and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State’” (quoting 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011))); 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (limiting 
state exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations when the accident 
occurred overseas despite multiple contacts with the forum state); see also Gwynne L. 
Skinner, Expanding General Personal Jurisdiction over Transnational Corporations for 
Federal Causes of Action, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 617, 656 (2017) (“If a victim, including 
one who is trafficked in the United States, brings suit against a foreign corporation 
under the TVPA [Trafficking Victims Protection Act], including against a 
[transnational corporation] doing significant business in the United States, the 
victim may well be out of luck even though Congress intended such victims to be able 
to obtain a remedy.”).  The jurisdictional problems that TVPRA claims are likely to 
face are the subject of a second work-in-progress by this author. 
 240. Ratha, 2016 WL 11020222, at *6. 
 241. Id. 
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because two defendants, Phatthana and S.S. Frozen Foods, were not 
present in the United States, subject-matter jurisdiction did not exist.242  
The court held that even if all defendants must be present in the United 
States for subject-matter jurisdiction to exist, the non-domestic entities 
were present, based on the allegations in the complaint, through their 
joint enterprise with the domestic defendants and because the domestic 
defendants were agents of the foreign defendants.243 
Ratha is significant to domestic entities because, unlike most ATS 
claims based on forced labor in the supply chain, the victim-employee’s 
TVPRA civil claims survived the motions to dismiss.  But on December 
21, 2017, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants.244  The case is presently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.245 
In granting judgment in favor of the defendants with a domestic 
presence, Rubicon and Wales, the court took an imposingly narrow 
view of the civil remedy provision, rejecting the argument that receipt 
of financial benefit is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the 
beneficiary “participat[e] in a venture.”246  
According to the court, the undisputed facts demonstrated that: 
Rubicon and Wales never had a business relationship with SSF. 
Although Rubicon had a business relationship with Phatthana, it was 
limited to ordering seafood products from Phatthana’s Songkhla 
factory. Wales’s involvement was limited to inspecting finished product 
ordered by Rubicon to ensure that product met Rubicon’s customers’ 
packaging specifications. With respect to working conditions and 
worker safety at all of the factories that Rubicon used as a source for its 
products, Rubicon relied on industry and government audits and 
certifications as well as customer visits, to ensure that the factories, 
including Phatthana’s Songkhla factory, operated in compliance with 
all applicable standards, including those pertaining to worker safety 
and welfare as well as compliance with labor laws. Wales relied on 
Rubicon to ensure that those factories did not exploit workers.247 
                                               
 242. Id. at *7. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. CV 16-4271-JFW (ASx), 2017 WL 
8293174, at *1, *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017). 
 245. See Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. 18-55041 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2018). 
 246. Ratha, 2017 WL 8293174, at *3.  To reiterate, Section 1595(a) provides, 
“whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from 
participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged 
in an act in violation of [the TVPRA].”  Id.  This piece of the court’s decision is hotly 
contested on appeal.  See infra notes 258–68 and accompanying text. 
 247. Id. at *2. 
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The court rejected the argument that the TVPRA criminalizes, and 
thus provides a civil remedy for, merely “passive” beneficiaries.  
Instead, the court was seeking some evidence that the domestic 
entities “‘took some action to operate or manage the venture,’ such 
as directing or participating in Phatthana’s labor recruitment, 
Phatthana’s employment practices, or the working conditions at 
Phatthana’s Songkhla factory.”248  Finding no facts demonstrative of 
this level of involvement, the court held the defendants did not 
knowingly participate in human trafficking.249 
The court also held that there was no evidence that the domestic 
defendants benefitted from the supplier’s human trafficking. It was  
“undisputed that [defendant] Rubicon never sold any product processed at 
Phatthana’s Songkhla factory during the time that any of the [p]laintiffs 
were employed there.”250  The plaintiffs argued that Rubicon benefitted 
from the human trafficking because the factory at issue was a “primary 
source of supply”; but the court found that the defendant had been selling 
seafood long before the alleged abuses and “during the relevant time 
period was selling approximately thirty-five million pounds of seafood per 
year.” Accordingly, the court held that “the fourteen containers of seafood 
purchased and ultimately returned during the same time period hardly 
qualifies as a ‘primary source of supply.’”251 
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that Rubicon and Wales knew or 
should have known that the supplier engaged in forced labor based 
on general reports about human trafficking in Thailand and reports 
and letters by human rights advocacy groups specifically criticizing 
the working conditions at the supplier factory.252  But the court held 
that “Rubicon’s and Wales’s knowledge of forced labor—at a factory 
that they did not own, operate, or have any control over—cannot be 
based solely on conflicting and sometime unsubstantiated general 
reports.”253  The court found no evidence that the defendants 
directed or participated in the offending supplier’s labor recruitment 
or employment practices, or that they were involved in establishing 
                                               
 248. Id. at *4 (quoting Bistline v. Jeffs, No. 2:16-CV-788 TS, 2017 WL 108039, at 
*11 (D. Utah Jan. 11, 2017), overruled in pertinent part sub nom., Bistline v. Parker, 918 
F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2019)). 
 249. Id. at *5. 
 250. Id. at *6. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at *5. 
 253. Id. 
1744 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1707 
 
the working conditions at the factory.254  Instead, defendant Rubicon 
relied on “industry and government audits and certifications” to 
ensure the factory met industry standards relating to worker safety 
and welfare.255  Rubicon also returned the product after allegations of 
worker exploitation were made public.256  Additionally, the court 
noted that Rubicon and Wales “actively sought to source product 
from companies that did not exploit their workers.”257 
As with the employee-based negligence cases, the court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants highlights that 
less control results in less of a legal duty to workers, which seems to 
directly contradict the purpose of the TVPRA.258  The district court’s 
narrow interpretation of “participation in a venture” (the key phrase 
which gives rise to the civil remedy provision) is hotly contested on 
appeal.  There are significant reasons it should be overturned.  First, 
the case on which the district court relied in requiring “more than 
receipt of a passive benefit,”259 Bistline v. Jeffs,260 was subsequently 
overturned on appeal.261  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit rejected the district’s court’s interpretation requiring “more than 
associating with or assisting an enterprise.”262  Instead, the Tenth Circuit 
held that “complaisance” in response to exhibitions of TVPRA violations 
is sufficient to meet the “participate in a venture” requirement.263 
 Another reason the district court’s heightened activity 
requirement for “participate in a venture” is likely to be overturned 
by the Ninth Circuit is because the First Circuit has held that 
complaisance in response to several exhibitions of TVPRA violations 
is sufficient to satisfy the “participate in a venture” element.  In 
                                               
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See Appellants’ Opening Brief at 2627, Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. 
18-55041 (9th Cir. May 25, 2018) (discussing congressional intent behind the 2008 
revisions to the TVPRA). 
 259. Ratha, 2017 WL 8293174, at *4 (quoting Bistline v. Jeffs, No. 2:16-CV-788 TS, 
2017 WL 108039, at *11 (D. Utah Jan. 11, 2017), overruled in pertinent part sub nom., 
Bistline v. Parker, 918 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2019)). 
 260. No. 2:16-CV-788 TS, 2017 WL 108039 (D. Utah Jan. 11, 2017), overruled in 
pertinent part sub nom., Bistline v. Parker, 918 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 261. See Parker, 918 F.3d at 873–76. 
 262. Jeffs, 2017 WL 108039, at *10; see also Parker, 918 F.3d at 873–76.  
 263. Parker, 918 F.3d at 873–76.  The Tenth Circuit relied heavily on Ricchio v. 
McLean, 855 F.3d 553, 557 (1st Cir. 2017), in interpreting “complaisance in response” 
to exhibitions of predicate violations as the requisite test for participation in a venture. 
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Ricchio v. McLean,264 retired Supreme Court Justice Souter, sitting by 
designation, held that a hotel owner’s exchange of high-fives and 
speaking of “getting this thing going again” with a male customer 
who repeatedly and visibly raped, starved and drugged the victim 
demonstrated “complaisance” in response to the violent and illegal 
acts.  This, according to the First Circuit, was sufficient to allege 
“participation in a venture” under § 1595(a).265  The defendants 
allegedly “benefitted” from this participation by receipt of the hotel 
payments.266  Thus, leading precedent establishes, for now, that the 
Ratha district court’s requirement of active conduct in the abusive 
labor practices or recruitment may have been unduly stringent. 
Another looming issue for those who would rely on the TVPRA’s 
extraterritorial grant to police domestic entities’ financial benefit 
from reckless disregard of forced labor in the supply chain is the 
Supreme Court’s nuanced limits on extraterritorial application of 
domestic statutes to foreign activity, even, whereas here, the 
Congressional intent to reach that activity is clear.  For example, in 
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community—a case arising out of 
allegations that RJR Nabisco violated RICO by participating in a 
global money-laundering scheme with various organized crime 
groups—the Court held that even though some of the RICO 
predicate offenses at issue in the case rebutted the presumption 
against extraterritorial application, the private right of action did 
not.267  The Court noted, “providing a private civil remedy for foreign 
conduct creates a potential for international friction beyond that 
presented by merely applying U.S. substantive law to that foreign 
conduct.”268  It is possible that following Nabisco, challenges to the 
TVPRA’s civil remedy provision could be construed to not have 
extraterritorial application because the extraterritorial jurisdictional 
grant, § 1596, does not specifically reference the civil remedy 
provision, § 1595.  That would be a tortured interpretation of the 
2008 amendments to the TVPRA as a whole, and to the specific 
extraterritorial grant outlined in § 1596. 
                                               
 264. 855 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 2017). 
 265. Id. at 557 (Souter, J., sitting by designation). 
 266. Id. (“It is likewise inferable that the Patels understood that in receiving 
money as rent for the quarters where McLean was mistreating Ricchio, they were 
associating with him in an effort to force Ricchio to serve their business objective.”). 
 267. 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016). 
 268. Id. 
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V.    HOW ADOPTING THE MODEL CONTRACT CLAUSES TO IMPLEMENT 
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS IN SUPPLY CONTRACTS CAN REDUCE THE 
THREAT OF LITIGATION 
One thing the foregoing discussion of domestic litigation involving 
allegations in the supply chain demonstrates is that litigation efforts, 
whether consumer or employee, are gaining momentum.  Consumer 
cases are developing through consumer protection statutes and an 
evolving understanding of what, if anything, about a product’s 
development is a material fact that must be disclosed.269  And employee-
based claims are continuing to develop under both the TVPRA, with its 
broad jurisdictional grant,270 and the ATS.271  One employee-based ATS 
claim still ongoing in California has been in litigation since 2005, which 
is a long time to be facing protracted litigation.272  But these lawsuits do 
more than seek money damages; they result in headlines and increased 
consumer awareness, which later becomes publicized in the 
marketplace.  Studies have shown that the number of consumers who 
are willing to pay more for sustainable brands is on the rise.273  That is 
where the MCCs to implement human rights protections in supply 
contracts come in.  In 2018, Professor David Snyder and Susan Maslow 
published the proposed MCCs developed by the Working Group.274  
The language and intent of those MCCs are set forth in that work. 
The cases discussed in this Article, however, laid the foundation for a 
specific part of those MCCs:  the disclaimers.  The Working Group 
                                               
 269. See supra Part III (discussing Nat’l Consumers League, the chocolate cases, and 
the fishermen cases). 
 270. See, e.g., Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. CV 16-4271-JFW (ASx), 2016 
WL 11020222, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2016). 
 271. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 272. Id.; see also Complaint, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. 2:05-CV-05133 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2005).  
 273. See, e.g., CONSUMER REPORTS® NAT’L RESEARCH CTR., FOOD LABELS SURVEY 2 
(2016), http://greenerchoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2016_CRFoodLa 
belsSurvey.pdf (“Most consumers (79%) are willing to pay more per pound for fruits 
and vegetables produced by workers who earned a living wage and were treated 
fairly.”); NIELSEN, THE SUSTAINABILITY IMPERATIVE:  NEW INSIGHTS ON CONSUMER 
EXPECTATIONS 2 (2015), https://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/nielsenglobal/dk/ 
docs/global-sustainability-report-oct-2015.pdf (last visited June 1, 2019) (“Sixty-six 
percent of consumers say they are willing to pay more for sustainable brands—up 
from 55% in 2014 and 50% in 2013.”); 2017 Cone Communications CSR Study, CONE 
http://www.conecomm.com/research-blog/2017-csr-study (last visited June 1, 2019) 
(finding that “87% [of consumers] will purchase a product because a company 
advocated for an issue they cared about and 76% will refuse to purchase a company’s 
products or services upon learning it supported an issue contrary to their beliefs”). 
 274. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 10, at 1093–94. 
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sought to research case law both to determine how powerful the threat 
of litigation might be against domestic entities (it turns out it is 
significant), but also, to determine if the cases suggested any theories of 
liability that should be considered in the contract clause drafting.  The 
goal of the Working Group, in part, was to encourage domestic 
corporate buyers to adopt the proposed contractual language.  In that 
spirit, the Working Group was careful, at this stage, to use language that 
would disclaim purchaser control over supplier operations or 
responsibility for worker safety, otherwise the question of a duty on 
behalf of a domestic retailer may be fairly in question.  This was the 
theory the courts rejected, based in part on the contractual language, in 
the employee-negligence cases.275  Monitoring, inspecting, and requiring 
a supplier to comply should be a purchaser right, not a duty, consistent 
with the cases finding no contractual liability on behalf of a domestic 
purchaser, such as Rahaman v. J.C. Penney and Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores.276  
Of course, what a retailer chooses to publish about these contractual 
rights to the public, as in National Consumers League, is a decision for 
corporate entities and not dictated by this Working Group. 
The disclaimers proposed by the Working Group are: 
5.7 Disclaimer Clauses.  Notwithstanding anything contained herein: 
a. Buyer does not assume a duty to monitor Supplier or its 
Representatives, including, without limitation, for compliance with 
laws or standards regarding working conditions, pay, hours, 
discrimination, forced labor, child labor, or the like; 
b. Buyer does not assume a duty to monitor or inspect the safety of 
any workplace of Supplier or its Representatives nor to monitor any 
labor practices of Supplier or its Representatives; 
c. Buyer does not have the authority and disclaims any obligation to 
control (i) the manner and method of work done by Supplier or its 
Representatives, (ii) implementation of safety measures by Supplier or 
its Representatives, or (iii) employment or engagement of employees 
and contractors or subcontractors by Supplier or its Representatives; 
d. There are no third-party beneficiaries to this Agreement; and 
                                               
 275. See supra Part II. 
 276. See Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. N15C-07-174 MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375, 
at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016); Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 685 
(9th Cir. 2009); see also supra Part II (discussing the rejection of both state-law 
negligence and unjust enrichment claims against employees based on lack of 
contractual control over the workplace). 
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e. Buyer assumes no duty to disclose the results of any audit, 
questionnaire, or information gained pursuant to this Agreement 
other than as required by applicable law.277 
The disclaimers were drafted with the allegations of duty in Rahaman 
and Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in mind, again with an eye towards 
protecting those business entities who would venture to adopt the 
MCCs from any interpretation that the agreement enhances control 
over their foreign suppliers or that might be used as a basis for a 
contractual duty to monitor foreign suppliers.  Therefore, the MCCs 
specifically disclaim a duty to monitor the Supplier for compliance 
with the law or standards for working conditions, forced labor, or child 
labor, although the contract may give the Supplier the right to do so.278  
The disclaimers also disclaim a duty to monitor or inspect the safety of 
a Supplier workplace, and the Supplier labor practices.279 
Likewise, the clauses disclaim any obligation to control the manner 
and method of the Supplier’s work, implementation of safety measures 
or employment, and any duty to disclose the results of any information 
gained pursuant to certain rights of the Buyer under these MCCs.280  
Finally, the disclaimers explicitly reject the idea that the employees of a 
Contracting Supplier are third-party beneficiaries of the representations 
and warranties made in the MCCs.281  Additionally, it appears that the 
level of control over the downside supplier may also be of factual 
importance in TVPRA civil liability claims.282 
Some critics will argue that the disclaimers go too far to insulate 
U.S. corporations from knowingly engaging in supply-agreements 
that involved forced labor or child labor in the supply chain.283  That 
                                               
 277. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 10, at 1105 (footnotes omitted).  The 
Working Group noted that some of these proposed disclaimers conflict with the 
requirements of the FAR.  See id. at 1105 n.46–47.  Additionally, the Working Group 
commented that 5.7(c) may conflict with other proposed MCCs and cautioned 
counsel to consider which clause would be more important to include in the contract.  
See id. at 1105 n.48.  Finally, the Working Group reflected that 5.7(e) “emphasizes that 
Buyer is assuming no contractual duties to disclose although Buyer may have duties to 
disclose under other standards (legal or non-legal).”  Id. at 1105 n.49. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See id. 
 282. See Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. CV 16-4271-JFW (ASx), 2017 WL 
8293174, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) (entering judgment in favor of 
defendants when there was no evidence of knowing participation or control over the 
entity allegedly engaged in the forced labor abuses). 
 283. See, e.g., Sarah Dadush, supra note 6, at 1521. 
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argument has some merit in that the goal in drafting the disclaimers, 
at least from my perspective, was to incentivize domestic entities to 
adopt the MCCs and not to increase exposure to domestic liability.  
Nonetheless, the MCCs can only go so far in reducing the likelihood 
that a contractual duty to downside Supplier employees would arise 
out of increased monitoring or rights to terminate bad actors.  The 
TVPRA, with its extraterritorial reach, still looms large as a check on 
domestic entities who knowingly benefit from engaging in a venture 
using forced labor, as does the ATS and consumer class-action 
fraudulent disclosure claims.  The disclaimers cannot and should not 
insulate a company who knowingly benefits from TVPRA predicate acts 
from civil liability.  To the contrary, in Ratha’s summary judgment grant, 
the court looked instead to the efforts the defendant was taking to 
inspect and monitor for forced labor in holding that it had not engaged 
in a venture.  In light of the traction these claims are gaining, both in 
courts and in the media, domestic entities would be well-advised to do 
more to detect and prevent forced labor in the supply chain even while 
contractually disclaiming a duty to remote supplier employees. 
Moreover, there may be reasons why a business would not want to 
adopt all or any of the Model Contract Disclaimers proposed by the 
Working Group.  One significant reason is that for entities who are 
governmental contractors, the disclaimers would likely run afoul of 
the Federal Acquisitions Regulation (“FAR”) for many contracts.284  
FAR 52.222-50(h), Combating Trafficking in Persons, requires any 
contractor providing supplies acquired outside the United States 
(other than commercially available off the shelf items) or services 
performed outside the United States with an estimated value to exceed 
$500,000 to maintain a compliance plan that includes “[p]rocedures to 
prevent agents and subcontractors at any tier and at any dollar value from 
engaging in trafficking in persons . . . and to monitor, detect, and terminate 
any agents, subcontracts, or subcontractor employees that have engaged in such 
activities.”285  This means that for government contracts meeting the 
$500,000 non-domestic supply requirement, the FAR necessitates a level 
of control inconsistent with the disclaimers discussed in this Part.  This 
conflict is indicated in the footnotes to the proposed disclaimers.286 
Moreover, a business may determine that, based on its consumer 
base and business needs, it seeks more control over its suppliers.  
                                               
 284. See Model Contract Clauses, supra note 10, at 1105 nn.46–47. 
 285. FAR 52.222-50(h)(3)(v) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 286. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 10, at 1105 nn.46–47. 
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Then, the disclaimers may not serve its business purpose.  For instance, 
a business may want to retain the right to terminate employees of 
Suppliers who engage in abusive labor practices consistent with Model 
Clause 5.3(c).  If so, that company might not want to include Model 
Contract Disclaimer 5.7(c).  Any business, of course, would need to work 
with its own lawyer to consider its business needs, its own inspection and 
monitoring practices, the likelihood of forced labor or child labor in its 
supply chain and the risk of litigation.  This may involve adopting some 
portions of the MCCs and eliminating others.  What the Working Group 
has done is provide a foundational starting point for that process. 
CONCLUSION 
Litigation advanced against domestic retailers of goods produced 
using supply-side forced labor has not proven successful in the court 
system yet, but avenues for legal claims, such as the TVPRA or false 
advertising claims seem to be gaining momentum.  The claims raised 
thus far rely on negligence, false advertising, ATS claims, and violations 
of the TVPRA, which has an explicit extraterritorial jurisdictional 
grant.  The Ninth Circuit permitted the latest complaint alleging ATS 
violations by child-slave-labor plaintiffs to survive, remanding it to the 
district court with permission to amend the complaint.  However, the 
Supreme Court’s presumption against extraterritoriality may pose a 
barrier to those claims.  Nonetheless, these lawsuits do more than seek 
money damages; they result in headlines and increased consumer 
awareness, which later becomes publicized in the marketplace.  Studies 
have shown many consumers shop with a preference for goods not 
sourced from forced labor or child labor.287  Domestic businesses that 
buy from international suppliers should implement contractual 
warranties and remedies to help guard against forced labor and child 
labor in the supply chain. The Working Group has proposed a set of 
MCCs designed to aid domestic companies in writing these contracts.  
Part of those clauses include strong disclaimers, drafted with the intent 
of shielding the domestic entity adopting the MCCs from increased 
liability based on the contract.  In light of the changing expectations of 
consumers and evolving theories of liability (both contractual and 
statutory), domestic buyers are well-advised to consider taking 
significant action, including adoption of the MCCs, to detect and 
remediate sources of abusive labor practices in their supply chains. 
                                               
 287. See, e.g., supra note 273. 
